Force indeed is not a datum, but an "actum" humanly present in effort. -Hans Jonas,
Introduction
The topic of agency has recently come into focus as "intrepid forays into this long-shunned territory are at last under way." 1 Although the tools of these investigations have largely been those of third-person science, some philosophers of mind like Tim Bayne and Shaun Gal--person reports should have an important role to play as well. The value and reliability of introspective appeals in cognitive science is by no means uncontroversial. 2 My misgivings, however, are not prompted by naturalist incredulity, but rather by a Romanticist insight originating in the work of Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer is perhaps best known for his iconoclastic defense of pessimism. Yet, that outlook rests on a comprehensive theory of mind, knowledge, and reality that casts serious doubt on the idea that our experience of willing could ever be vindicated by a more complete phenomenological understanding. At the risk of oversimplifying, what prompts this assessment is Schopenhauer's contention that the will falls outside the domain of the phenomenal. It is not -person experience of agency cannot be put into language; rather, according to Schopenhauer, true agency as such cannot even be represented-linguistically or otherwise.
In order to understand this remarkable claim, I turn to Charles Sanders Peirce's semiotics. Schopenhauer and Peirce are united in their rejection of (what they take to be) Hegelian idealism. 3 Building on this kinship, I turn to Peirce's categories in order to motivate the idea that not every aspect of our lives can be put into signs. 4 ically, I believe that the account of twoPeircean semiotics vindicates Schopenhauer's contention that brute exercises of the will pertain to the un-represented. 2 Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, "Introspection and the Phenomenology of Free Will: Problems and Prospects," Journal of Consciousness Studies -3 Roughly, Peirce charged Hegel with having neglected the brute fact of "struggle." Robert Stern has recently tried to diffuse this accusation by showing that "it is possible to read Hegel in a way that shows him to have accorded just the same status to these categories as Peirce himself demanded." See Robert Stern, "Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of Secondness," Inquiry -analogous to secondness is perhaps the highest compliment one can pay to Peirce, since it implies that a tenable philosophic system should make room for such a thing. I agree with this position. (I also think it is less of a stretch to claim that Schopenhauer countenanced dyadic relations than to claim that Hegel did so). 4 I should stress that, in this paper, I am interested solely with what agency "is" (i.e., what it means for one to actually "have" or implement it), not with how it is ascribed to others. For a semiotic account of the latter that has much in common with Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge: MIT Press, Kristian , "When Agents Become Expressive: A Theory of Semiotic Agency," Cognitive Semiotics -mainly to Schopenhauer, and the second half mainly to Peirce. In the Schopenhauer to the notions of phenomena and noumena. In the second section ("An Explicit Double Standard"), I examine the twin theses at the core of Schopenhauer's philosophy, namely that a) the ) thought does not exhaust being. In the third section ("Semiotic Subsumption"), I recast these twin theses in terms of Peirce's triadic categorial scheme, such that acts of agency pertain to two-term relations, and representations of such acts pertain to three-term relations. Finally, in the fourth section ("Prescission and Indexicality"), I explore the technical resources provided by Peircean semiotics in order to discuss (obliquely) the topic of the un-represented.
Phenomenology and its Scope
The typical account of agency seems straightforward enough. A thought is antecedent to a bodily event. Provided the succession of the two meets a handful of sensible constraints-for instance, the relevance of the posited cause and the absence of plausible competitors that could more parsimoniously lead to the same outcome-this having been the motive force of the behavior. However, sundry experimental studies have shown that the retrospective inference that grounds this alleged mental causation is liable to all the vicissitudes that accompany any theoretically-mediated reasoning, chief among which is the possibility of being mistaken. Spurred by these results, the psychologist Daniel Wegner has famously concluded that -person experience of will is, in fact, baseless. On this view, the human brain produces an expedient narrative that secures a false sense of authorship ex post facto. 5 However, as Bruce Bridgeman points out in an otherwise laudatory review of Wegner's book, The Illusion of Conscious Will 6 , when all the dust has cleared, the repudiation of will as illusory, even if true, is largely vacuous because it simply cannot be put into prac- 7 We may not be in charge, but we clearly go on feeling and believing that we are. This has prompted some philosophers of mind to challenge the illusion claim on phenomenological grounds. Tim Bayne, for example, has maintained that the synoptic interpretation of experimental data has proceeded somewhat hastily and has not -person experience. 8 Concomitant with a battery of criticisms on the methodological front 9 , he has thus pushed for a more thorough understanding of the phenomenology of agency:
One response to will skeptics-as we shall call them-is to challenge their interpretations of the data derived from the cognitive sciences.... We suspect that much of the motivation for the current wave of will skepticism derives from rather naive models of the phenomenology of agency. A more nuanced account of the phegnitive sciences are telling us about ourselves. 10 Bayne is by no means alone in this regard. Responding to experiments that purportedly show the conscious mind lagging behind the body when performing an action 11 , Shaun Gallagher 12 has argued that too much weight has been placed on the idea that one must have some kind of preview of an action for it to be willed. 13 16 , it was Husserl who went on to give phenomenology the status it currently enjoys, so the method has come to be associated with his call for a return "zu den Sachen selbst." In Husserl's usage, the "things themselves" are those appearances continuously displayed before the apprehending subject. Technically speaking, though, the antonym of "phenomenon" remains the "noumenon," a notion that also makes a claim to being the Consciousness Studies, vol.
--14 Shaun Gallagher, "Mutual Enlightenment: Recent Phenomenology in Cognitive Science," Journal of Consciousness Studies -recourse can be described as part of a self-conscious "Continental philosophy of mind"-a research program that has been described as "burgeoning by the minute" by David Morris, "Philosophy of Mind," thing "in itself." There is of course a difference between "things themselves" and "things in themselves" and this is the object of my present concern. When philosophers of mind like Bayne and Gallagher call for a more in-depth investigation of the phenomenology of agency, the very terms in which they frame their inquiry seem to prejudge the outcome, surreptitiously barring other (nonphenomenal) possibilities. To be clear, the concern here is not exegetical. It is not that contemporary thinkers have endorsed a phenomenological inquiry into agency without considering that it could also be read in a Kantian key. Rather, the repercussions I want to call attention to are more consequential. Current advocates of a phenomenology of agency often assume that the will is something one can internally gaze upon or contemplate in some fashion-that it is something amenable to a descriptive scrutiny liable of being discursively reported. Bayne and Levy, for example, state that experiences of mental causation, authorship, and effort all "have representational content. That is, they present the world-in this case, the agent and his or her actions-as being a certain way." 17 This is certainly plausible, but it is far from obvious. At the very least, Schopenhauer's philosophy gives good reasons to think that the will cannot so easily be grasped. Like Kant, Schopenhauer held that we represent objects as existing in space and time, and that we represent events as having an antecedent cause. These, he argued, are not really properties that obtain in the world. Instead, the mind adds them to the mix in its attempt to cognitively process its experiential inputs. Schopenhauer's contribution to this Kantian thesis-which, modulo some reservations 18 , he regarded as correct-was his insistence that exercises of agency do not involve this sort of processing. In addition to knowing ourselves as we know other things-through representationswe also experience ourselves as willing certain ends. Yet, this experience (if it can indeed be so called) is a privileged one that stands out 17 representational content concords with the noetic-noematic framework emHubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison Hall, eds., Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science recent debates does seem to be that we have a preand that this provides enough cognitive traction for us to take our willing as an (introspective) object of apprehension. 18 Robert Wicks, "Schopenhauer's Naturalization of Kant's A Priori Forms of Empirical Knowledge," History of Philosophy Quarterly -from the usual fare of processed intake. "Consequently, it may be said that the knowing subject has a twofold knowledge of the body, vaguely put as knowledge of it both as representation (like every outer object) and as will (unlike any outer object)." 19 Since Schopenhauer often sought to reshape commonsensical intuitions, it is important to understand the particular sense in which he used the term "will." Bayne and Levy, for instance, have distinguished between three components of a phenomenology of agency, depending on whether one focuses on the experience of mental causation, authorship, or effort. Although this tripartition has merit, I be made at leisure, since I detect no ready principle that could halt the process. 20 Second, breaking down the will into various parts is ill-suited to a discussion of Schopenhauer's philosophy, in so far as he saw fragmentation into plurality as a sort of accident added to what is otherwise a unitary notion. 21 Third, some of the terms of the partition, most notably "mental causation," are moot (as the authors themselves recognize) and, when combined with the natural assumption that if they are applicable then they are necessary features of agency, seem to prejudge the issue at hand (in a direction away from embodiment, moreover). To be sure, some provisional distinctions are in order. Nevertheless, it might be wise not to put too much use. 22 In a more familiar context, "will" means "free will." Typically, this is taken as the faculty possessed by humans and not by plants. Will consensual relationships, etc. However, when Schopenhauer discusses the will, he is usually alluding to a motive force that can be expressed whether or not there are such alternatives. In this sense, "will" is a much more basic notion. A plant striving to reach sunlight manifests this drive. Technical execution notwithstanding, a weightlifter stokes her conative furnace and generates the energy needed to accomplish her Herculean task. Choosing to lift a barbell is not enough-the athlete must actually do it. Whether or not the environment complies with what is undertaken is unimportant. As Schopenhauer writes: "The will is in the dark concerning the external world in which its objects lie; and it rages like a prisoner against the ontology of will and representation, Schopenhauer is alluding mainly to this conception of "will"-the less glamorous one that, in the would correspond to its animality. 23 As discussed previously, Schopenhauer's ideas are an explicit response to the Kantian system. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason had attempted to hug the contours of human intelligibility so as to delineate (from the inside, as it were) the frontier of thought. Phenomena can be shown to exist without showing up as an appearance, then, by d and thus lie outside the ambit of phenomenological description. As it ihe will is thing-in-itself; as such, it is not representation at all, but toto genere different thereprimal bodily events capable of transgressing these limits (by simply willing is the only opportunity we have of understanding simultaneously from within any event that outwardly manifests itself; consequently, it is the one thing known to us immediately, and not given to Given that the initiative we marshal in behavior lets us commune in an unmediated fashion with the mind-independent world, Schopenhauer would have regarded the current project of a "phenomenology" of agency as effectively vitiating the profundities our willing has to offer. As G. S. Neely notes:
Thus, although we do have an avenue of direct and immediate access to the thing-in-itself (which is discovered through the introspective examination of bodily agency), if we are to bring this subtle awareness to the forefront of consciousness in order to "think" about it and talk about it plainly, we will have to locate a word signifying an appropriate concept.... By extending the term "will" to include non-rational, impersonal forces, Schopenhauer effectively re-directs the reach of the term away from distinct phenomena and toward that non-cognitive striving which lies at the root of all phenomena. 24 those of Hegel. Two very different worldviews were going head-tohead. While Hegel sang the praises of the disembodied "Idea" and strove to eliminate Kant's noumenal realm in favor of a grand entelechy of "the Absolute," Schopenhauer made the domain of the unrepresented the site of his centrality of our guts, genitals, muscles, and tendons in cognition. 25 This radically anti-Cartesian emphasis on the body explains why Schopenhauer described the intellect as a "subsidiary organ" of the -a momentous shift that has led Julian Young to declare Schopenhauer "if not the father, certainly the grandfather" of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology. 26 The merits of that conception were eventually recognized by some (most notably Nietzsche and Freud), and are increasingly taking center stage as "the second-generation cognitive revolution consists largely of the study on the embodiment of mind; that is, the bodily basis of meaning." 27 At the time, however, Schopenhauer's challenging theses were illity and left his almost vacant. Let us now re-examine those tenets in a 24 G. 
An Explicit Double Standard
Schopenhauer maintained that the will is noumenal. 29 The rationale behind this claim can be broken down into two sub-theses, which are expressed in Schopenhauer's two-volume World as Will and Representation asonMonadology,
should be thus and not otherwise"-provides an exhaustive explanation of phenomena. The second is that phenomena-understood as -person appearances amenable to linguistic description-do not exhaust reality. Jointly considered, these tenets suggest that the confabulation account of agency (like the one championed by Wegner) could very well hold true for all that is represented-but that not everything is representable.
It is a coarse corporeal impetus that, in Schopenhauer's view, gives us a privileged ingress into the true, mind-independent nature of things. Such a forceful contact, Schopenhauer 30 argued, can be traced back to the fact that our bodies are irrevocably enmeshed with the natural world-our minds are an outgrowth of our bodies. 31 He nonetheless considered the idea of free will to be a chimera. In a held that "only subsequently, and thus wholly a posteriori man making a chemical experiment applies the reagents, and then ahead of its time, laying the groundwork for the now commonplace idea that our psychological motives are not necessarily known to us 28 undeniable existence of the will, the primitive nature that it ascribes to agentive acts leads to a cynical view akin to the contemporary insight into one's bodily happenings. Yet, far from considering it to be an "illusion," Schopenhauer saw self-generated action as the supreme truth upon which all subsequent knowledge claims (scienown willing occupying pride of place in his architectonic. 33 The resultant conception carves out a neglected notional space that allows Schopenhauer to agree with Wegner that conscious will is essentially the product of a confabulated narrative ex post facto, whilst holding fast to the idea that the will per se is there all along, toiling underneath the discursive reports we weave. Straddling the frontiers of philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphysics, this mixed position beckons us to countenance the causa sui-yet reminds us that this motive force shall always appear as determined by an antecedent factor. 34 On this view, strict determinism reigns in the phenomenal realm, but the noumenal realm is governed by the nonmind and action therefore divides the caused and the causa sui into two separate domains: the caused belongs to the phenomenal, which is represented, and the causa sui belongs to the noumenal, which cannot be represented.
Of course, this way of accommodating apparently incompatible notions turns on an appeal to a thing-in-itself (here glossed as will). Kantianism has by now lost much of its purchase, so there is an understandable tendency among contemporary theorists to disavow It is not simply that knowledge of agency is not like other kinds of knowledge; it is different in being immediate. Unfortunately, the notion of immediate knowledge...is not clear, despite the numerous occasions on which it has been invoked in philosophy. Presumably, to say that knowledge is immediate is to say that it is not mediated by anything. 36 I believe it is here that Charles Sanders Peirce's semiotic framework has much to offer.
Peirce argued that any representation involves an irreducible this vehicle stands, and third, a mediating term of some sort for which there is such a "standing for." In many ways, this is a very place-holders. Still, it is a robust formula, as the three components anything to represent. Delete any relatum, and the bond that sustained the representation collapses. An im-mediate relation, then, would be just that: a mere relation between two things that has no representational value (although it can have one, if taken as such by something external to it). Far from concluding from this that only what is represented exists, Peirce insisted that the triadic character of representation entails a way out of Idealism, compelling us to countenance realities that are patently non-representational (or 35 Carl Hausman, for example, is led to the same (Peircean) view as the one developed in this paper, yet writes "I trust that this conclusion about the role of pre-cognitive experience will not be criticized for implying a commitment to the legitimacy of the concept of a thing-in-itself." See Carl Hausman, "T. L. Short's Theory of Signs," -:
However, Hausman does not explain this statement-the reasons why such a commitment should be deemed shameful are apparently too obvious to be rehearsed. 36 David Hamlyn, "Schopenhauer and Knowledge," The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer more appropriately sub-representational). 37 As I proceed to show, this Peircean semiotic viewpoint allows us to better comprehend Schopenhauer's contention that the will is not an appearance.
The construal of representation at work in semiotics is arguably far more sophisticated than anything found in Schopenhauer's corpus. After all, for Schopenhauer, theoretical philosophy was but a means to a more spiritual and aesthetic end 38 ; whereas, for Peirce, it was the focal point of an almost obsessive lifelong pursuit. 39 Yet, in spite of their different emphases, I believe the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Peirce are, in crucial respects, mutually supportive. I do not mean to suggest that Schopenhauer's work somehow anticipated that of Peirce (or that Peirce's work recapitulated that of Schopenhauer). Rather, my contention is simply that the construal of the will as noumenal can be carefully extracted from its original context and made more rigorous by disrobing it of the Kantian idiom in which it was originally formulated. 40 
Semiotic Subsumption
Viewed from the standpoint of Peircean semiotics, what Schopenhauer states, in effect, is that although the declarative intelligibility expected of free agents is possible solely by recourse to triadic representation, this appeal does not preclude, but in fact presupposes, a dyadic relation that is patently not beholden to any form of mediation by the mind. 41 This technical gloss augments Schopenhauer's unique construal of agency with Peirce's seminal recognition that three-term relations subsume two-term relations. Hence, even though the will is exercised in events which require the addition of a third term in order to be interpreted, we can logically discern its 37 ordinal priority in such events (I will say more about this cognitive operation in the following section). eSimilarly, it is part of Schopenhauer's account that the very presence of effort on the part of an agent requ cardinal point of Schopenhauer's doctrine that as far as humanbeings are concerned the will manifests itself only in doing." 42 The insight provided by the will thus comes by way of a visceral contact-a situated collision of subject and object that has nothing to do with deliberation and conceptual knowledge. It is not so much that a lack of confrontation would let our striving spread off evenly into a void, like a soundless scream in outer space (which would correspond to Peirce's "Firstness"). Rather, the very absence of constraint, one could say, makes will constitutively impossible. 43 In contrast with internalist accounts of the mind, this view countenances relations that have one foot in the external world. 44 In a passage reminiscent of Schopenhauer, Peirce writes: "A door is slightly ajar. You try to open it. Something prevents. You put your shoulder against it, and experience a sense of effort and a sense of resistance. These are not two forms of consciousness; they are two aspects of one twothe presence of two and only two things prohibits the emergence of a causal chain or direction of priority. It is more like a duel-and at this categorial level of "Secondness," the duelists have no inkling as to who is winning or whether they are in fact part of a greater melee. Peirce goes on to write: "For will, then, as one of the great types of consciousness, we ought to substitute the polar sense," where "polar That said, just as Schopenhauer incorporated both will and representation into the mix, so Peirce recognized that an interpretation is needed in order make this twoequently, Peirce held that "he who wills is conscious of doing so, in the sense of representing to himself that he does so." 45 Most contemporary advocates of a phenomenology of agency would probably concur with such a statement. However, in keeping with their methodo--person reports at face value, they would regard such mediation as unproblematic. By contrast, Schopenhauer and Peirce argue that the mere fact of representing an episode of willing introduces an additional feature not possessed by the will.
What mediation by the mind adds is conformity to the principle of a constitutive need to make anything and everything intelligible in terms of antecedent causes (which extend serially in both direcot determined by a agency support this view. Bayne and Levy, for instance, remark that "even if it is possible to experience oneself as a mover, it does not follow that it is possible to experience oneself as an unmoved mover. It is hard to see how one could experience an agent causal relation as undetermined by prior states." 46 This is a philosophical realization, and it applies to experimental subjects and clinical observers alike. We might say it is a normal, and even desirable, by-product of being nhauer did not think this epistemological condition of possibilitywhich he fully acknowledged and even helped to clarify in his FRentails the metaphysical nonexistence of the will. 47 This is because extending it beyond its proper scope to things that are in no way acting as signs:
general is the expression of the fundamental form at the very core of our cognitive faculty, namely the basic form of necessary connexion between all our objects, i.e., our representations.... But for this very reason we are , as the absolute eternal order of the world and of all that exists, such a principle, outside and independently of the mechanism of our cognitive faculty from which it has sprung. 48 later adds that "this bodybased signature is a highly useful tool" in that it "helps us to tell the difference between things we're doing and all the other things that are happening in and around us." (Ibid made here: something "useful" cterized as merely epiphenomenal. 51 Tim J. Bayne and Elisabeth Pacherie, "Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-Awareness," Synthese -discrete occurrence, if anything is. 53 Moreover, any such act is causal moves things about). So, the succession of thoughts needs to be otherwise we will be faced with a regress of representations. In short, we need a theory that carves out a place for action. Schopenhauer provides such a theory.
The Schopenhauerian stance is that our bodily participation in discursive articulation. By contrast, the illusion claim propounded by Wegner effectively throws a cloak of mystery over human agency. On his view, it is not merely that subjects apprehend their willing through a mnemonic lens; rather, such a lens is held to be opaque. The irony is that Schopenhauer was in many respects the forebear of this view. Yet, instead of hastily endorsing what can best be described as a "disenchanted" view of the human predicament, he provided complex philosophical, psychological, and biological arguments that in the end vindicate-inadvertently, as it happens-our intuitive sense that we have an active part to play in constituting our lives. 54 Thus, let us not forget that the thinker who pioneered the confabulation account also made it a point to underscore that causal forces always leave the will itself singularly untouched.
Prescission and Indexicality
In the course of his phenomenological investigations, Merleau-Ponty was compelled to acknowledge that "the perception of our own body" in action betokens "a logic lived through" that attains clarity that show how discrepancies in proprioceptive feedback that begin to dissipate the phenomenological feel of being in control of a movement, and I note that, "if the sense of agency is inversely proportionate to the delay, then the lower limit of such a temporal gradation (which marks no discrepancy) would have to entail an absolute agentive involvement in an hic et nunc event...insofar as an 'instantaneous feedback' bereft of any sequentiality is no This question can be answered by reviewing how many things are needed for there to be a sign. We may begin with two untendentious premises. First, we collect assent to the logical dictum that whatever is complex is composed of simples. This realization (which so captivated Leibniz and later Russell) is as secure as it is trivial. However, the realization becomes crucially important once we grant a second already complex-very complex in fact. Of course, phenomenologists of all stripes have long noted this. 57 Semiotics, though, is not phenomenology, so no methodological constraint forbids the semiotician to adulterate this baseline of lived experience. Therefore, we may take this complexity and begin to remove some items. This movetermed "prescission"-is permissible because, as stated, anything complex subsumes something simpler. In prescinding, then, we attend to some elements and deliberately neglect others. --58 In this sense, the method of presciss inference rule applied to (in our case, three-term) conjunctions in logical derivation. Despite its utility, this parallel has limitations since t ication applies to can exist on their own as robustly as the conjunction can. This, however, is not the case with all three elements of the sign relation, so there is a genuine need for a different label. For more on prescission, see Marc Champagne, "Explaining the Qualitative Dimension Now, suppose that, armed with this "focusing mechanism," 59 we have done quite a bit of pruning and are left with, say, only four things (here using the term "thing" loosely). Can there still be a sign? Certainly, since one of these things could conceivably stand for another to yet another. 60 So we continue supposing simpler scenarios. Three items still allows for sign-action or semiosis. A major shift occurs, however, when we get down to two. Suddenly, the situation becomes too sparse for us to assemble anything plausibly resembling a sign. We, as thinkers gleaning this fact, do not suddenly vanish from existence; we have been (and remain) there all along. However, in supposing increasingly simpler states of affairs, we eventually learn something informative about the constitutive conditions of rather smoothly, and although the resulting setting becomes more intuitions prevents semiosis from unfolding. When we dip below three elements, however, we hit a real barrier that involves impersonal considerations, which are not at all the product of whim or social convention.
With only two things there can be no sign action, and this for principled (i.e., demonstrable) reasons. And since two, and only two, things are involved in acts of agency 61 , we can better understand Schopenhauer's claim that, in order for one to seize upon the true nature of the will, one has to "think away" the contribution of the If no methodological restriction is placed on how many things one can countenance, one is free to run an account that helps itself to far richer descriptions of conscious life (and life simpliciter reasons to think that, once interpretation enters the picture, things have to get complex. See Marc Champagne, "Some Semiotic Constraints on Metarepresentational Accounts of Consciousness," in Semiotics -62 Perhaps this explains why Peirce's rejection of things in themselves was absolutely incognizable." ) vided by traditional logical argumentation. 63 The kinship between this Peircean appeal to the self-evident and phenomenology is by now widely recognized 64 , and the complexity premise can justly be see). Yet, since quite a bit of epistemological doctoring needs to be done for that setting to yield the insights that are of interest to a study of signs, in prescinding we are performing something very different from phenomenological description, which i desire to capture human experience as it actually presents itself. 65 Hence, while such scholars as Spiegelberg 66 are correct to draw a parallel between the semiotic tool of prescission and the Husserlian method of "eidetic variation," 67 I disagree with those 68 who think experience whilst still falling under the rubric of the phenomenological. 69 Most ule to infer "P and Q, therefore P," then eidetic variation is akin to appealing to the commutative law to license "P and Q, therefore Q and P." 70 Umberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Prescission calls attention to the fact that there is another limit to semiosis at its simpler bookend 71 -a constraint on what one can say tout court. 72 It would, of course, be contradictory to claim that one can "think the unthinkable." Philosophers eager to spot this contradiction often leap to an indiscriminate dismissal of the noumenal. Yet, there is no contradiction whatsoever in the claim that one can "touch the unthinkable." That is what Schopenhauer and Peirce are saying. If one has a problem with such a suggestion, it certainly cannot be on account of any formal shortcoming. Interestingly, Peirce-who was no slouch in logic-diffused the objection that the noting that "if intelligibility be a category, it is not surprising but rather inevitable that other categories should be in different relations to this one."
73
As Wittgenstein famously urged in the seventh clause of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the bounds of discourse must be respected, and whatever ineffable surplus lies beyond should be met with silence. 74 In his survey of semiotic theories, Winfried taxonomizes this response as "transsemiotic agnosticism." 75 To a 71 Umberto Eco, Kant and the Platypus: Essays on Language and Cognition (New 72 Paul Livingston has argued that Anglo-American ("Analytic") philosophy has been held particularly captive by the "assumption that structuralist forms of explanation can adequately account for everything that we ordinarily say about ourselves." Paul Livingston, Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness ophy of mind, by contrast, does not seem to be as severely handicapped by this assumption, and so is more receptive to the thesis-defended from different angles by Schopenhauer and Peirce alike-that, as a matter of logic, the action of signs must comprise its share of ineffability. 73 Peirce did not always see things that way. In one of his earliest papers (from cognizability (in its widest sense) and being "phenomenology" from Hegel ( insisting that "the category of thought...is an essential ingredient of reality, yet does not by itself constitute reality, since this category...can have no concrete being without action, as a separate object on which to work its government...."
lly dropped the contention that cognizability and being are coextensive, his mature view is very close to Schopenhauer's. 74 stressed that logic exhausts all that can be put in language but intimated that one could nevertheless try to "show" ("zeigen") that which language and logic cannot capture 77 , Schopenhauer held that causality exhausts what can be represented but maintained that what can be represented does not exhaust all that is. And it is there, in that non-cognitive blind spot that narration cannot reach 78 , that the will dwells.
Aside from prescissive analysis, is there any other way to bypass this limitation? Interestingly, semiotics studies the employment, not just of symbols, but of indices and icons as well. Indexicality is particularly germane. It is analogous to the will in that it is a dyadic relation that does not entail (but is entailed by) representation. 79 Just as one cannot exert effort upon a thing without being in contiguous contact with it, so must one's body be in the vicinity of an object in order to denote it by ostension. Of course, an interpretation (by oneself or someone else) is needed to seal the semiotic transaction, "otherwise what 'this' refers to is indeterminate: is it (for example) the door in front of me that I am pushing, the door in the wall, the wall in the building, the building in the city, and so on-what exactly is the 'this' to which my indexical refers, outside some further speciclass of things to which the 'this' belongs?" 80 However, when we clarify the referent by adding a third ingredient, we ipso facto ensure that we are no longer dealing with just two things. 81 To be sure, in the locution "I just can't describe it," the index "it" (vaguely) circumscribes the area of reality that escapes description. To that extent, one To the extent one endorses a sign-theoretic approach to the study of consciousness, it is self-contradictory to countenance triads whilst denying the simpler relations these presuppose. The commitment is optional, but the entailment is not. It is hard to see, though, how phenomenological reports could ever do without the employment of signs. So, if Schopenhauer's central thesis is correct, and acts of the will are by themselves too brute to be genuine phenomena, then traditional phenomenological strategies like "bracketing" 82 will bring no succor in the laudable quest for a better understanding of agency. Of course, knowing in detail why the two-term relations involved in acts of the will fall below the level of representation (and thus intelligibility) does not spontaneously give one the means to escape that descriptive limitation. Prescission can only do so much. Thus, while I see nothing in the Schopenhauerian theses previously canvassed that bars an informative semiotic account of agency, it goes without saying that, as embodied human beings, the semiotician and the phenomenologist are both condemned to the same fate.
Conclusion
For an exercise of agency to be free, it would have to "proceed absolutely and quite originally from the will itself, without being brought about necessarily by antecedent conditions, and hence also without being determined by any anything according to a rule." 83 This poses a problem, since "the positing of a ground, in all of its meanings, is the essential form of our entire cognitive faculty," whereas in trying to conceive an uncaused act "we are here asked to refrain from positing a ground." 84 I have proposed a new way to look at this thesis by arguing, with the help of C. S. Peirce, that our ability to layer a triadic interpretation upon our bodily struggles with the world neither usurps nor annuls the brute dyad that it subsumes.
While this revised Peircean take on the Schopenhaurian account of agency lends some support to the criticisms of illusionism independently put forth by Bayne and Gallagher, it does so at the price of can succeed in reporting where (roughly) the relevant limitations lie. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that the only robust referential work a sentence like "I just can't describe it" succeeds in doing is a (second-order) description of the inability at hand-82 Gallagher and Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind -. 83 Arthur Schopenhauer, Essay on the Freedom of the Will, (tr.) K. Kolenda 84 Ibid -undermining the phenomenological descriptions they have called for. These philosophers of mind prescribe phenomenology to counter "will skeptics," who are presumed to be skeptical on naturalist grounds. I have introduced a view that sees agency as escaping not only third--person description as well. Despite its Romanticist origins, this view can be motivated by a semiotic analysis of what it means to represent a bodily act (this is, perhaps, as close as we shall ever come to "naturalizing" voluntarism).
Schopenhauer warned that "that which exists independently of our knowledge and of all knowledge, is to be regarded as something quite different from the representation and all its attributes, and This warning should be taken seriously: given that the will forever lies unrepresented, it is answerable to modalities wholly incommensurate with those govPhenomenologists have long issued statutes of methodological limitation on what certain research programs can, even in principle, hope to achieve. 85 I have suggested that the phenomenological project might harbor a blind spot of its own.
eneglect of the topic; perhaps it arises from the fact that the phenomenology of agency appears to be less vivid and stable than the phenomenology of perception." 86 Although it is entirely correct to speak of a relative neglect (and to suspect this as a probable cause of our poor phenomenological understanding), the account of agency outlined here suggests that the "obscurity" alluded to by the authors might be intrinsic to the topic-albeit not for any lack of vividness. 87 
